Government Agenda-Setting and Bicameral Conflict Resolution

David Fortunato*, Thomas König, Sven-Oliver Proksch

*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Abstrakt

We examine the extent to which governments consider the role of bicameral conflict resolution procedures in legislative agenda-setting. We argue that governments may use these institutions to promote policy change in the event of bicameral conflict, especially when facing uncertainty over bicameral policy preferences. We test our arguments using comprehensive original data on forty years of German legislation and find that bicameral conflict resolution committees play a more sophisticated role in governmental policy making than previously suspected.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftPolitical Research Quarterly
Vol/bind66
Udgave nummer4
Sider (fra-til)938–951
Antal sider14
ISSN1065-9129
DOI
StatusUdgivet - dec. 2013
Udgivet eksterntJa

Bibliografisk note

Published online: 10. May 2013.

Emneord

  • Bicamerlism
  • Agenda-setting
  • Executive-legislative interactions
  • Legislative institutions
  • German politics

Citationsformater