From Closed to Contestable Markets: Product Differentiation in Indian Durable Consumer Goods Industry

Amal Sanyal, Murali Patibandla

    Publikation: Working paperForskning

    Resumé

    We examine the most likely strategy of product differentiation by newly entering multinational firms when market reforms begin in a developing economy. We argue that incumbents in a non contestable protected market do not have the usual advantages of an incumbent as in a standard sequential entry model of contestable markets. In this context we use a model of vertical product differentiation to argue that a new entrant will choose a higher quality product and a higher price given the income distribution profile brought in by the market reforms. We test the propositions empirically on the basis of firm level panel data for five Indian durable consumer goods industries.
    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    Udgivelses stedKøbenhavn
    UdgiverDepartment of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School
    Antal sider20
    StatusUdgivet - 1999
    NavnWorking Paper / Department of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School
    Nummer9-1999

    Citer dette

    Sanyal, A., & Patibandla, M. (1999). From Closed to Contestable Markets: Product Differentiation in Indian Durable Consumer Goods Industry. København: Department of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School. Working Paper / Department of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School, Nr. 9-1999
    Sanyal, Amal ; Patibandla, Murali. / From Closed to Contestable Markets : Product Differentiation in Indian Durable Consumer Goods Industry. København : Department of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School, 1999. (Working Paper / Department of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School; Nr. 9-1999).
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    Sanyal, A & Patibandla, M 1999 'From Closed to Contestable Markets: Product Differentiation in Indian Durable Consumer Goods Industry' Department of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School, København.

    From Closed to Contestable Markets : Product Differentiation in Indian Durable Consumer Goods Industry. / Sanyal, Amal; Patibandla, Murali.

    København : Department of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School, 1999.

    Publikation: Working paperForskning

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    N2 - We examine the most likely strategy of product differentiation by newly entering multinational firms when market reforms begin in a developing economy. We argue that incumbents in a non contestable protected market do not have the usual advantages of an incumbent as in a standard sequential entry model of contestable markets. In this context we use a model of vertical product differentiation to argue that a new entrant will choose a higher quality product and a higher price given the income distribution profile brought in by the market reforms. We test the propositions empirically on the basis of firm level panel data for five Indian durable consumer goods industries.

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    Sanyal A, Patibandla M. From Closed to Contestable Markets: Product Differentiation in Indian Durable Consumer Goods Industry. København: Department of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School. 1999.