Forecasters' Objectives and Strategies

Iván Marinovic*, Marco Ottaviani

*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

    Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapportBidrag til bog/antologiForskningpeer review

    Abstrakt

    This chapter develops a unified modeling framework for analyzing the strategic behavior of forecasters. The theoretical model encompasses reputational objectives, competition for the best accuracy, and bias. Also drawing from the extensive literature on analysts, we review the empirical evidence on strategic forecasting and illustrate how our model can be structurally estimated.
    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    TitelHandbook of Economic Forecasting
    Antal sider31
    Vol/bind2
    ForlagElsevier
    Publikationsdato2013
    UdgavePart B
    Sider690-720
    ISBN (Trykt)9780444627315
    DOI
    StatusUdgivet - 2013
    NavnHandbook of Economic Forecasting
    Vol/bind2
    ISSN1574-0706

    Emneord

    • Bias
    • Exaggeration
    • Forecasting contest
    • Herding
    • Reputational cheap talk

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