Fishy Business

Multijurisdictional Treatment of a Horizontal Merger in Salmon Farming

Peter Møllgaard

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

Recent decentralisation of EU competition policy led observers to fear that competition authorities in different member states would implement rules differently. This case study shows that such concern is real. A 2006 merger was notified to competition authorities in multiple jurisdictions. Despite a unique consensus on economic modelling and facts, authorities reached different conclusions regarding the long-run effects of the merger. Most authorities cleared the merger unconditionally but one made clearance conditional on divestitures. Behind the different treatment lie either different objectives or different theories of competitive harm. Both explanations are troubling since the authorities could have used the European Commission as a coordinating device.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftEuropean Competition Journal
Vol/bind6
Udgave nummer3
Sider (fra-til)677-688
Antal sider11
ISSN1744-1056
DOI
StatusUdgivet - dec. 2010

Citer dette

@article{a8e0d6e407974b1fab340373e7124858,
title = "Fishy Business: Multijurisdictional Treatment of a Horizontal Merger in Salmon Farming",
abstract = "Recent decentralisation of EU competition policy led observers to fear that competition authorities in different member states would implement rules differently. This case study shows that such concern is real. A 2006 merger was notified to competition authorities in multiple jurisdictions. Despite a unique consensus on economic modelling and facts, authorities reached different conclusions regarding the long-run effects of the merger. Most authorities cleared the merger unconditionally but one made clearance conditional on divestitures. Behind the different treatment lie either different objectives or different theories of competitive harm. Both explanations are troubling since the authorities could have used the European Commission as a coordinating device.",
keywords = "Assessment of Remedies, Merger, Cournot Model",
author = "Peter M{\o}llgaard",
year = "2010",
month = "12",
doi = "10.5235/ecj.v6n3.677",
language = "English",
volume = "6",
pages = "677--688",
journal = "European Competition Journal",
issn = "1744-1056",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "3",

}

Fishy Business : Multijurisdictional Treatment of a Horizontal Merger in Salmon Farming. / Møllgaard, Peter.

I: European Competition Journal, Bind 6, Nr. 3, 12.2010, s. 677-688.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Fishy Business

T2 - Multijurisdictional Treatment of a Horizontal Merger in Salmon Farming

AU - Møllgaard, Peter

PY - 2010/12

Y1 - 2010/12

N2 - Recent decentralisation of EU competition policy led observers to fear that competition authorities in different member states would implement rules differently. This case study shows that such concern is real. A 2006 merger was notified to competition authorities in multiple jurisdictions. Despite a unique consensus on economic modelling and facts, authorities reached different conclusions regarding the long-run effects of the merger. Most authorities cleared the merger unconditionally but one made clearance conditional on divestitures. Behind the different treatment lie either different objectives or different theories of competitive harm. Both explanations are troubling since the authorities could have used the European Commission as a coordinating device.

AB - Recent decentralisation of EU competition policy led observers to fear that competition authorities in different member states would implement rules differently. This case study shows that such concern is real. A 2006 merger was notified to competition authorities in multiple jurisdictions. Despite a unique consensus on economic modelling and facts, authorities reached different conclusions regarding the long-run effects of the merger. Most authorities cleared the merger unconditionally but one made clearance conditional on divestitures. Behind the different treatment lie either different objectives or different theories of competitive harm. Both explanations are troubling since the authorities could have used the European Commission as a coordinating device.

KW - Assessment of Remedies

KW - Merger

KW - Cournot Model

U2 - 10.5235/ecj.v6n3.677

DO - 10.5235/ecj.v6n3.677

M3 - Journal article

VL - 6

SP - 677

EP - 688

JO - European Competition Journal

JF - European Competition Journal

SN - 1744-1056

IS - 3

ER -