Extremists Not on Board: Labor Market Costs to Radical Behavior in Elected Office

Benjamin Egerod, Hai Tran

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Abstract

Board appointments represent highly lucrative career opportunities for former politicians. We investigate how board service relates to the strength of ideological partisanship for former members of Congress. We find that strong ideological partisanship is associated with a lower likelihood of being appointed to a board after Congress and that this holds for both liberals and conservatives. In addition, we use a difference-in-differences design to show that when the supply of senators willing to accept a directorship increases, firms become less likely to appoint ideological extremist senators to their boards. The results show that extremist legislators are effectively shut out of one of the most lucrative postelective career paths, placing a cost on radical behavior.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftJournal of Politics
Vol/bind85
Udgave nummer3
Sider (fra-til)1161-1165
Antal sider5
ISSN0022-3816
DOI
StatusUdgivet - jul. 2023

Bibliografisk note

Published online: 19 May 2023

Emneord

  • Revolving door
  • Postelective labor market
  • Political incentives and selection
  • Political polarization
  • Punishment of political extremism

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