EU Competition Policy Since 1990: How Substantial is Convergence Towards U.S. Antitrust?

Dzmitry Bartalevich

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    In spite of the evidence of strong influence on the incorporation of policy provisions from the U.S. antitrust into the recent competition policy reforms in the European Union (EU), few considerable attempts have been made to analyze the influence of U.S. antitrust on EU competition policy in anticartel enforcement policies, antimonopoly regulation, and the regulation of mergers and acquisitions. The purpose of this article is to fill the gap by attempting to link EU competition policy with U.S. antitrust, provide a critical overview of the most important elements of European competition policy reforms, carry out a comparative analysis between EU and U.S. competition policies, detect convergence or divergence, and account for the degree of convergence and for the relevant mechanisms triggering convergence. The main focus is on the analysis of anticartel enforcement policy, antimonopoly policy, and merger control.
    TidsskriftJournal of Centrum Cathedra
    Udgave nummer2
    Sider (fra-til)273-294
    StatusUdgivet - 2013


    • EU competition Policy
    • U.S. Antitrust
    • Convergence
    • Regulation
    • Anticartel Enforcement
    • Leniency Notice
    • Abuse of Market Dominance
    • Merger Control
    • Meger regulation