## Abstract

We consider a queueing environment where a finite number of customers independently choose when to arrive at a queueing system that opens at a specific time and serves customers on a last-come first-serve preemptive-resume (LCFSPR) basis. Each customer has a service time requirement that is identically and independently distributed, and customers want to complete service as early as possible while minimizing the time spent in the queue. We establish the existence of a symmetric (mixed) Nash equilibrium and show that there is at most one symmetric equilibrium. We provide a

numerical method to compute this equilibrium and demonstrate by an example in which the social efficiency is lower than that induced by a similar queueing system that serves customers on a first-come first-serve (FCFS) basis.

numerical method to compute this equilibrium and demonstrate by an example in which the social efficiency is lower than that induced by a similar queueing system that serves customers on a first-come first-serve (FCFS) basis.

Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Titel | Book of Abstracts : Abstracts of 15th European Meeting on Game Theory (Formerly Spain-Italy-Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory – SING15) |

Redaktører | Mitri Kitti |

Antal sider | 1 |

Udgivelsessted | Turku |

Forlag | University of Turku |

Publikationsdato | 2019 |

Status | Udgivet - 2019 |