Equilibrium Arrival Times to Queues

The Case of Last-come First Serve Preemptive Resume

Jesper Breinbjerg, Lars Peter Østerdal

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Resumé

We consider a non-cooperative queueing environment where a finite number of customers independently choose when to arrive at a queueing system that opens at a given point in time and serves customers on a last-come first-serve preemptive-resume (LCFS-PR) basis. Each customer has a service time requirement which is identically and independently distributed according to some general probability distribution, and they want to complete service as early as possible while minimizing the time spent in the queue. In this setting, we establish the existence of an arrival time strategy that constitutes a symmetric (mixed) Nash equilibrium, and show that there is at most one symmetric equilibrium. We provide a numerical method to compute this
equilibrium and demonstrate by a numerical example that the social effciency can be lower than the effciency induced by a similar queueing system that serves customers on a first-come first-serve (FCFS) basis.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Udgivelses stedOdense
UdgiverSyddansk Universitet
Antal sider22
StatusUdgivet - 2017
NavnDiscussion Papers on Business and Economics
Nummer3/2017

Emneord

  • Queueing
  • Strategic arrival times to a queue
  • Non-cooperative games

Citer dette

Breinbjerg, J., & Østerdal, L. P. (2017). Equilibrium Arrival Times to Queues: The Case of Last-come First Serve Preemptive Resume. Odense: Syddansk Universitet. Discussion Papers on Business and Economics, Nr. 3/2017
Breinbjerg, Jesper ; Østerdal, Lars Peter. / Equilibrium Arrival Times to Queues : The Case of Last-come First Serve Preemptive Resume. Odense : Syddansk Universitet, 2017. (Discussion Papers on Business and Economics; Nr. 3/2017).
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Equilibrium Arrival Times to Queues : The Case of Last-come First Serve Preemptive Resume. / Breinbjerg, Jesper; Østerdal, Lars Peter.

Odense : Syddansk Universitet, 2017.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

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