Enemy at the Gates: Short-selling and Firm Performance on Corporate Social Responsibility - Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Vanya Rusinova, Georg Wernicke

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskningpeer review

Abstrakt

In this paper, we test for a causal relationship between short-selling and firms’ performance on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). To establish causality, we use the exogenous variation in short-selling restrictions induced by the Pilot Program under Regulation SHO of 2004. The Pilot program decreased the costs of short-selling for randomly selected subset of firms which resulted in an increase in the threat of short-selling for these firms. Results from a sample of U.S. firms for the years 2002 - 2006 suggest that an increase in the likelihood of being subject to short-selling increases firm performance on CSR. We further test how the temporal orientation of firms’ institutional owners and different level of firms’ financing constraints moderate the relationship between short-selling and firm performance on CSR.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Publikationsdato2017
StatusUdgivet - 2017
BegivenhedStrategic Management Society 38th Annual International Conference. SMS 2018 - Paris Marriott Rive Gauche Hotel, Paris, Frankrig
Varighed: 22 sep. 201825 sep. 2018
Konferencens nummer: 38
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Konference

KonferenceStrategic Management Society 38th Annual International Conference. SMS 2018
Nummer38
LokationParis Marriott Rive Gauche Hotel
LandFrankrig
ByParis
Periode22/09/201825/09/2018
Internetadresse

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Citationsformater

Rusinova, V., & Wernicke, G. (2017). Enemy at the Gates: Short-selling and Firm Performance on Corporate Social Responsibility - Evidence from a Natural Experiment. Paper præsenteret på Strategic Management Society 38th Annual International Conference. SMS 2018, Paris, Frankrig.