Email Negotiation: Argument, Cognition and Deadlock in Email Negotiation

    Publikation: Working paperForskning

    18 Downloads (Pure)

    Resumé

    This paper investigates a set of email negotiations in order to explain a high number of deadlocks. The paper argues that one reason is the combination of cognitive effort characteristic of the e-mail genre, and the argumentative pattern found when two parties simultaneously try to persuade the other of the justice of their cause. For a negotiation involving the wording of a contract, the evidence suggests that, while there is a distinct advantage in the features of reviewability and revisablity, the email format allows selective attention to the other party’s arguments, which can be shown to block suggestions and lead to sub-optimal results.
    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    Udgivelses stedFrederiksberg
    UdgiverInstitut for Interkulturel Kommunikation og Ledelse, IKL. Copenhagen Business School
    Antal sider19
    StatusUdgivet - 13 dec. 2010

    Emneord

    • Email Negotiation
    • Media Richness

    Citer dette

    Bülow, A. M. (2010). Email Negotiation: Argument, Cognition and Deadlock in Email Negotiation. Frederiksberg: Institut for Interkulturel Kommunikation og Ledelse, IKL. Copenhagen Business School.
    Bülow, Anne Marie. / Email Negotiation : Argument, Cognition and Deadlock in Email Negotiation. Frederiksberg : Institut for Interkulturel Kommunikation og Ledelse, IKL. Copenhagen Business School, 2010.
    @techreport{bdcc1217db1843dbace48330a9ab5b6a,
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    abstract = "This paper investigates a set of email negotiations in order to explain a high number of deadlocks. The paper argues that one reason is the combination of cognitive effort characteristic of the e-mail genre, and the argumentative pattern found when two parties simultaneously try to persuade the other of the justice of their cause. For a negotiation involving the wording of a contract, the evidence suggests that, while there is a distinct advantage in the features of reviewability and revisablity, the email format allows selective attention to the other party’s arguments, which can be shown to block suggestions and lead to sub-optimal results.",
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    Bülow, AM 2010 'Email Negotiation: Argument, Cognition and Deadlock in Email Negotiation' Institut for Interkulturel Kommunikation og Ledelse, IKL. Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg.

    Email Negotiation : Argument, Cognition and Deadlock in Email Negotiation. / Bülow, Anne Marie.

    Frederiksberg : Institut for Interkulturel Kommunikation og Ledelse, IKL. Copenhagen Business School, 2010.

    Publikation: Working paperForskning

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    Bülow AM. Email Negotiation: Argument, Cognition and Deadlock in Email Negotiation. Frederiksberg: Institut for Interkulturel Kommunikation og Ledelse, IKL. Copenhagen Business School. 2010 dec 13.