Electoral Underpinnings of Oligarchy

A Survey Experiment in South Africa

Mogens K. Justesen, Stanislav Markus

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskning

Resumé

Why do voters – including the poor – elect super-rich business candidates into power? In the age of anti-elite political populism, the support of tycoons by people in countries as diverse as the United States, Benin, and Ukraine suggests a puzzle. To address this puzzle, we marshal evidence from a survey experiment in South Africa, a country where wealthy business people are heavily engaged in politics. Theoretically, we extend the literatures on inequality and voting behavior by testing a number of competing explanations for the voter support of "tycoon candidates." Relative to voter appeals based on competence signaling, name recognition, and framing, it is the clientelistic appeals which benefit tycoon candidates the most. We suggest extensions to the literature on clientelism based on these findings.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Publikationsdatoaug. 2018
Antal sider25
StatusUdgivet - aug. 2018
BegivenhedAmerican Political Science Association, APSA Annual Meeting 2018: Democracy and its Discontents - Boston, USA
Varighed: 30 aug. 20182 sep. 2018
Konferencens nummer: 114
https://connect.apsanet.org/apsa2018/

Konference

KonferenceAmerican Political Science Association, APSA Annual Meeting 2018
Nummer114
LandUSA
ByBoston
Periode30/08/201802/09/2018
Internetadresse

Bibliografisk note

CBS Bibliotek har ikke adgang til materialet

Citer dette

Justesen, M. K., & Markus, S. (2018). Electoral Underpinnings of Oligarchy: A Survey Experiment in South Africa. Afhandling præsenteret på American Political Science Association, APSA Annual Meeting 2018, Boston, USA.
Justesen, Mogens K. ; Markus, Stanislav. / Electoral Underpinnings of Oligarchy : A Survey Experiment in South Africa. Afhandling præsenteret på American Political Science Association, APSA Annual Meeting 2018, Boston, USA.25 s.
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Justesen, MK & Markus, S 2018, 'Electoral Underpinnings of Oligarchy: A Survey Experiment in South Africa' Paper fremlagt ved American Political Science Association, APSA Annual Meeting 2018, Boston, USA, 30/08/2018 - 02/09/2018, .

Electoral Underpinnings of Oligarchy : A Survey Experiment in South Africa. / Justesen, Mogens K.; Markus, Stanislav.

2018. Afhandling præsenteret på American Political Science Association, APSA Annual Meeting 2018, Boston, USA.

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskning

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Justesen MK, Markus S. Electoral Underpinnings of Oligarchy: A Survey Experiment in South Africa. 2018. Afhandling præsenteret på American Political Science Association, APSA Annual Meeting 2018, Boston, USA.