Efforts to combat global money laundering have established a transnational administrative regime that provides peer review mutual evaluations that are coordinated among national public administrations. Led by the Financial Action Task Force, this regime encourages compliance with anti-money laundering (AML) standards to detect “effectiveness” in administrative capacity despite an absence of reliable data on money laundering activity. This article examines how national administrations engage different types of consultants in the preparation of mutual evaluations. I distinguish between the use of bespoke consultants who actively interpret effectiveness by wealthier countries, and “box-ticking” consultants from global professional service firms which developing countries are more reliant on. As such, the transnational administration of AML governance and its links to consultants reflects and reinforces global power asymmetries. Wealthy countries can positively use consultants to manage their policy horizons, while developing countries are left with short-term compliance that is not aimed at building administrative capacity.