Dynamic Capital Structure with Callable Debt and Debt Renegotiations

Peter Ove Christensen, Christian Riis Flor, David Lando

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

We consider a dynamic trade-off model of a firm's capital structure with debt renegotiation. Debt holders only accept restructuring offers from equity holders backed by threats which are in the equity holders' own interest to execute. Our model shows that in a complete information model in which taxes and bankruptcy costs are the only frictions, violations of the absolute priority rule (APR) are typically optimal. The size of the bankruptcy costs and the equity holders' bargaining power affect the size of APR violations, but they have only a minor impact on the choice of capital structure.
We consider a dynamic trade-off model of a firm's capital structure with debt renegotiation. Debt holders only accept restructuring offers from equity holders backed by threats which are in the equity holders' own interest to execute. Our model shows that in a complete information model in which taxes and bankruptcy costs are the only frictions, violations of the absolute priority rule (APR) are typically optimal. The size of the bankruptcy costs and the equity holders' bargaining power affect the size of APR violations, but they have only a minor impact on the choice of capital structure.
SprogEngelsk
TidsskriftJournal of Corporate Finance
Vol/bind29
Sider644-661
Antal sider18
ISSN0929-1199
DOI
StatusUdgivet - dec. 2014

Emneord

  • Dynamic capital structure
  • Violation of absolute priority
  • Debt restructuring

Citer dette

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Dynamic Capital Structure with Callable Debt and Debt Renegotiations. / Christensen, Peter Ove; Flor, Christian Riis; Lando, David.

I: Journal of Corporate Finance, Bind 29, 12.2014, s. 644-661.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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AB - We consider a dynamic trade-off model of a firm’s capital structure with debt renegotiation. Debt holders only accept restructuring offers from equity holders backed by threats which are in the equity holders’ own interest to execute. Our model shows that in a complete information model in which taxes and bankruptcy costs are the only frictions, violations of the absolute priority rule (APR) are typically optimal. The size of the bankruptcy costs and the equity holders’ bargaining power affect the size of APR violations, but they have only a minor impact on the choice of capital structure.

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