Distinctions, Affiliations, and Professional Knowledge in Financial Reform Commissions

    Publikation: Bidrag til konferencePaperForskningpeer review

    Resumé

    Who determines what ideas matter in reform debates? This article examines reform proposals from the expert groups that emerged during the recent international financial crisis. To do so it follows fractal distinctions - distinctions that replicate themselves in subsequent iterations – among the reports. Fractal distinctions, such as between ‘behavior’ or ‘system’ as a reform focus, allow us to locate the object of regulation within expert groups, experts’ professional context, and the politics behind the commissioning of work. Analyzing fractal distinctions provides a useful way to understand the different stresses in reports with and without clear mandates, and the role of important members of the policy community in promoting particular reform ideas. The article finds that differences in ideas emerging from the financial reform expert groups reflect nested power relationships in the commissioning of work, constituent audiences, and reform priorities among governing institutions, rather than distinct ‘European’ and ‘American’ ideas.
    Who determines what ideas matter in reform debates? This article examines reform proposals from the expert groups that emerged during the recent international financial crisis. To do so it follows fractal distinctions - distinctions that replicate themselves in subsequent iterations – among the reports. Fractal distinctions, such as between ‘behavior’ or ‘system’ as a reform focus, allow us to locate the object of regulation within expert groups, experts’ professional context, and the politics behind the commissioning of work. Analyzing fractal distinctions provides a useful way to understand the different stresses in reports with and without clear mandates, and the role of important members of the policy community in promoting particular reform ideas. The article finds that differences in ideas emerging from the financial reform expert groups reflect nested power relationships in the commissioning of work, constituent audiences, and reform priorities among governing institutions, rather than distinct ‘European’ and ‘American’ ideas.

    Workshop

    WorkshopThe EU in Global Finance
    LokationUniversity of Amsterdam
    LandHolland
    ByAmsterdam
    Periode14/02/201315/02/2013

    Bibliografisk note

    CBS Bibliotek har ikke adgang til materialet

    Citer dette

    Seabrooke, L., & Tsingou, E. (2013). Distinctions, Affiliations, and Professional Knowledge in Financial Reform Commissions. Afhandling præsenteret på The EU in Global Finance, Amsterdam, Holland.
    Seabrooke, Leonard ; Tsingou, Eleni. / Distinctions, Affiliations, and Professional Knowledge in Financial Reform Commissions. Afhandling præsenteret på The EU in Global Finance, Amsterdam, Holland.24 s.
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    abstract = "Who determines what ideas matter in reform debates? This article examines reform proposals from the expert groups that emerged during the recent international financial crisis. To do so it follows fractal distinctions - distinctions that replicate themselves in subsequent iterations – among the reports. Fractal distinctions, such as between ‘behavior’ or ‘system’ as a reform focus, allow us to locate the object of regulation within expert groups, experts’ professional context, and the politics behind the commissioning of work. Analyzing fractal distinctions provides a useful way to understand the different stresses in reports with and without clear mandates, and the role of important members of the policy community in promoting particular reform ideas. The article finds that differences in ideas emerging from the financial reform expert groups reflect nested power relationships in the commissioning of work, constituent audiences, and reform priorities among governing institutions, rather than distinct ‘European’ and ‘American’ ideas.",
    author = "Leonard Seabrooke and Eleni Tsingou",
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    Seabrooke, L & Tsingou, E 2013, 'Distinctions, Affiliations, and Professional Knowledge in Financial Reform Commissions' Paper fremlagt ved The EU in Global Finance, Amsterdam, Holland, 14/02/2013 - 15/02/2013, .

    Distinctions, Affiliations, and Professional Knowledge in Financial Reform Commissions. / Seabrooke, Leonard; Tsingou, Eleni.

    2013. Afhandling præsenteret på The EU in Global Finance, Amsterdam, Holland.

    Publikation: Bidrag til konferencePaperForskningpeer review

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    AU - Tsingou,Eleni

    N1 - CBS Library does not have access to the material

    PY - 2013

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    N2 - Who determines what ideas matter in reform debates? This article examines reform proposals from the expert groups that emerged during the recent international financial crisis. To do so it follows fractal distinctions - distinctions that replicate themselves in subsequent iterations – among the reports. Fractal distinctions, such as between ‘behavior’ or ‘system’ as a reform focus, allow us to locate the object of regulation within expert groups, experts’ professional context, and the politics behind the commissioning of work. Analyzing fractal distinctions provides a useful way to understand the different stresses in reports with and without clear mandates, and the role of important members of the policy community in promoting particular reform ideas. The article finds that differences in ideas emerging from the financial reform expert groups reflect nested power relationships in the commissioning of work, constituent audiences, and reform priorities among governing institutions, rather than distinct ‘European’ and ‘American’ ideas.

    AB - Who determines what ideas matter in reform debates? This article examines reform proposals from the expert groups that emerged during the recent international financial crisis. To do so it follows fractal distinctions - distinctions that replicate themselves in subsequent iterations – among the reports. Fractal distinctions, such as between ‘behavior’ or ‘system’ as a reform focus, allow us to locate the object of regulation within expert groups, experts’ professional context, and the politics behind the commissioning of work. Analyzing fractal distinctions provides a useful way to understand the different stresses in reports with and without clear mandates, and the role of important members of the policy community in promoting particular reform ideas. The article finds that differences in ideas emerging from the financial reform expert groups reflect nested power relationships in the commissioning of work, constituent audiences, and reform priorities among governing institutions, rather than distinct ‘European’ and ‘American’ ideas.

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    Seabrooke L, Tsingou E. Distinctions, Affiliations, and Professional Knowledge in Financial Reform Commissions. 2013. Afhandling præsenteret på The EU in Global Finance, Amsterdam, Holland.