Disentangling Disproportionality

    Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikel

    Abstrakt

    The literature on deviations from one share-one vote seems to ignore that a difference between influence and investment, i.e., disproportionality, may exist without control enhancing mechanisms such as dual class shares. I propose a method to disentangle disproportionality and argue for its relevance. The consequences are documented on a testing data set.
    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    TidsskriftEconomics Letters
    Vol/bind117
    Udgave nummer3
    Sider (fra-til)743-745
    ISSN0165-1765
    DOI
    StatusUdgivet - 2012

    Emneord

    • Ownership structure
    • Disproportionality
    • Voting power
    • Firm value

    Citationsformater