Discontinuous Nash Equilibria in a Two-stage Linear-quadratic Dynamic Game with Linear Constraints

Rajani Singh; Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel

doi:10.1109/TAC.2018.2882160

Discontinuous Nash Equilibria in a Two-stage Linear-quadratic Dynamic Game with Linear Constraints

Rajani Singh
, Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel^*

^*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

University of Warsaw

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

Abstract

In this note, we study a simple example of a two-stage linear-quadratic dynamic game in which the presence of simple linear state dependent constraints results in nonexistence of continuous symmetric feedback Nash equilibria and the existence of continuum of discontinuous symmetric feedback Nash equilibria. The example is not an abstract model-it has obvious applications in economics of resource extraction.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Artikelnummer	8556031
Tidsskrift	IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Vol/bind	64
Udgave nummer	7
Sider (fra-til)	3074-3079
Antal sider	6
ISSN	0018-9286
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2018.2882160
Status	Udgivet - jul. 2019
Udgivet eksternt	Ja

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Emneord

Games
Silicon
Nash equilibrium
Economics
Optimization
Mathematical model
Biomass

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Citationsformater

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