Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing

An Axiomatic Characterization

Jens Leth Hougaard, Lars Peter Østerdal

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

Resumé

The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker (Econometrica 60:1009–1037, 1992) and the decreasing serial rule of de Frutos (J Econ Theory 79:245–275, 1998) are known by their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties. An axiomatic characterization of the increasing serial rule was provided by Moulin and Shenker (J Econ Theory 64:178–201, 1994). This paper gives an axiomatic characterization of the decreasing serial rule.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftInternational Journal of Game Theory
Vol/bind38
Udgave nummer4
Sider (fra-til)469-479
ISSN0020-7276
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2009
Udgivet eksterntJa

Emneord

  • Serial cost sharing
  • Cost allocation
  • Axiomatic characterization

Citer dette

Hougaard, Jens Leth ; Østerdal, Lars Peter. / Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing : An Axiomatic Characterization. I: International Journal of Game Theory. 2009 ; Bind 38, Nr. 4. s. 469-479.
@article{8587d50ba28d4b00bcdec804bc2cbbd3,
title = "Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing: An Axiomatic Characterization",
abstract = "The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker (Econometrica 60:1009–1037, 1992) and the decreasing serial rule of de Frutos (J Econ Theory 79:245–275, 1998) are known by their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties. An axiomatic characterization of the increasing serial rule was provided by Moulin and Shenker (J Econ Theory 64:178–201, 1994). This paper gives an axiomatic characterization of the decreasing serial rule.",
keywords = "Serial cost sharing, Cost allocation, Axiomatic characterization, Serial cost sharing, Cost allocation, Axiomatic characterization",
author = "Hougaard, {Jens Leth} and {\O}sterdal, {Lars Peter}",
year = "2009",
doi = "10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6",
language = "English",
volume = "38",
pages = "469--479",
journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",
issn = "0020-7276",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "4",

}

Hougaard, JL & Østerdal, LP 2009, 'Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing: An Axiomatic Characterization', International Journal of Game Theory, bind 38, nr. 4, s. 469-479. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6

Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing : An Axiomatic Characterization. / Hougaard, Jens Leth; Østerdal, Lars Peter.

I: International Journal of Game Theory, Bind 38, Nr. 4, 2009, s. 469-479.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing

T2 - An Axiomatic Characterization

AU - Hougaard, Jens Leth

AU - Østerdal, Lars Peter

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker (Econometrica 60:1009–1037, 1992) and the decreasing serial rule of de Frutos (J Econ Theory 79:245–275, 1998) are known by their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties. An axiomatic characterization of the increasing serial rule was provided by Moulin and Shenker (J Econ Theory 64:178–201, 1994). This paper gives an axiomatic characterization of the decreasing serial rule.

AB - The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker (Econometrica 60:1009–1037, 1992) and the decreasing serial rule of de Frutos (J Econ Theory 79:245–275, 1998) are known by their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties. An axiomatic characterization of the increasing serial rule was provided by Moulin and Shenker (J Econ Theory 64:178–201, 1994). This paper gives an axiomatic characterization of the decreasing serial rule.

KW - Serial cost sharing

KW - Cost allocation

KW - Axiomatic characterization

KW - Serial cost sharing

KW - Cost allocation

KW - Axiomatic characterization

UR - https://sfx-45cbs.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/45cbs?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rfr_id=info:sid/sfxit.com:azlist&sfx.ignore_date_threshold=1&rft.object_id=954925407734&rft.object_portfolio_id=&svc.holdings=yes&svc.fulltext=yes

U2 - 10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6

DO - 10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6

M3 - Journal article

VL - 38

SP - 469

EP - 479

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

SN - 0020-7276

IS - 4

ER -

Hougaard JL, Østerdal LP. Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing: An Axiomatic Characterization. International Journal of Game Theory. 2009;38(4):469-479. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6

Adgang til dokument