Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing: An Axiomatic Characterization

Jens Leth Hougaard; Lars Peter Østerdal

doi:10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6

Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing: An Axiomatic Characterization

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

Abstrakt

The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker (Econometrica 60:1009–1037, 1992) and the decreasing serial rule of de Frutos (J Econ Theory 79:245–275, 1998) are known by their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties. An axiomatic characterization of the increasing serial rule was provided by Moulin and Shenker (J Econ Theory 64:178–201, 1994). This paper gives an axiomatic characterization of the decreasing serial rule.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	International Journal of Game Theory
Vol/bind	38
Udgave nummer	4
Sider (fra-til)	469-479
ISSN	0020-7276
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6
Status	Udgivet - 2009
Udgivet eksternt	Ja

Emneord

Serial cost sharing
Cost allocation
Axiomatic characterization

Adgang til dokumentet

10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6Licens: Ikke-specificeret

Citationsformater

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