This article examines the coordination mechanisms, in Germany and Denmark, which develop nego-tiation positions for the Council in the European Union (EU). The analysis studies these mechanisms through the lens of the ‘politics of institutional choice’ approach, which previous scholars have ap-plied to examine EU coordination in Eastern and Central Europe. The results demonstrate that the approach travels well to EU member states in Western Europe. More precisely, they show that the power of the individual ministers, as well as the type of government (minority vs. majority), are im-portant factors in explaining differences in the way the two member states handle EU coordination. This strengthens the argument that the traits of the EU coordination mechanisms in EU member states are a function of power relations between domestic actors.
|Tidsskrift||Journal of Contemporary European Research|
|Status||Udgivet - 2016|
- EU coordination
- Domestic politics
- Politics of institutional choice
- Veto players