Abstract
This paper presents a framework of the control of inter-organizational relationships. Building on transaction cost economics and organizational theory, two control problems are identified that arise when firms engage in inter-organizational relationships: the management of appropriation concerns and the coordination of tasks. The control mechanisms used to manage these control problems and their interrelationships with informal (trust-based) mechanisms are discussed. The explanatory power of the framework is assessed by a case study of a strategic alliance between a buyer and a supplier of railway safety equipment.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Accounting, Organizations and Society |
Vol/bind | 29 |
Udgave nummer | 1 |
Sider (fra-til) | 27-49 |
Antal sider | 23 |
ISSN | 0361-3682 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 2004 |
Udgivet eksternt | Ja |