Competition in Soccer Leagues

Bodil Olai Hansen, Mich Tvede

Publikation: Working paperForskning

3 Downloads (Pure)

Resumé

In the present paper a model of competition between sports clubs in a sports league is presented. Clubs are endowed with initial players but at a cost clubs are able to sell their initial players and buy new players. The results are that: if the quality of players is one-dimensional, then equilibria in pure strategies exist, and; if the quality of players is multi-dimensional, then there need not exist equilibria in pure strategies, but equilibria in mixed strategies exist. Equilibria in mixed strategies resemblance signings just before the transfer window closes in european soccer. competition between sports clubs, dimension of quality of players, equilibrium in pure strategies, equilibrium in mixed strategies.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Udgivelses stedFrederiksberg
UdgiverDepartment of Economics. Copenhagen Business School
Antal sider10
StatusUdgivet - 2007
NavnWorking Paper / Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School
Nummer10-2007

Emneord

  • Competition between sports clubs
  • Competition between sport clubs
  • Dimension of quality of players
  • Equilibrium in pure strategies
  • Equilibrium in mixed strategies

Citer dette

Olai Hansen, B., & Tvede, M. (2007). Competition in Soccer Leagues. Frederiksberg: Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School. Working Paper / Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School, Nr. 10-2007
Olai Hansen, Bodil ; Tvede, Mich. / Competition in Soccer Leagues. Frederiksberg : Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School, 2007. (Working Paper / Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School; Nr. 10-2007).
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Olai Hansen, B & Tvede, M 2007 'Competition in Soccer Leagues' Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg.

Competition in Soccer Leagues. / Olai Hansen, Bodil; Tvede, Mich.

Frederiksberg : Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School, 2007.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

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AU - Tvede, Mich

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N2 - In the present paper a model of competition between sports clubs in a sports league is presented. Clubs are endowed with initial players but at a cost clubs are able to sell their initial players and buy new players. The results are that: if the quality of players is one-dimensional, then equilibria in pure strategies exist, and; if the quality of players is multi-dimensional, then there need not exist equilibria in pure strategies, but equilibria in mixed strategies exist. Equilibria in mixed strategies resemblance signings just before the transfer window closes in european soccer. competition between sports clubs, dimension of quality of players, equilibrium in pure strategies, equilibrium in mixed strategies.

AB - In the present paper a model of competition between sports clubs in a sports league is presented. Clubs are endowed with initial players but at a cost clubs are able to sell their initial players and buy new players. The results are that: if the quality of players is one-dimensional, then equilibria in pure strategies exist, and; if the quality of players is multi-dimensional, then there need not exist equilibria in pure strategies, but equilibria in mixed strategies exist. Equilibria in mixed strategies resemblance signings just before the transfer window closes in european soccer. competition between sports clubs, dimension of quality of players, equilibrium in pure strategies, equilibrium in mixed strategies.

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KW - Dimension of quality of players

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Olai Hansen B, Tvede M. Competition in Soccer Leagues. Frederiksberg: Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School. 2007.