CEO Turnovers and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Copenhagen Stock Exchange

Robert Neumann, Torben Voetmann

Publikation: Working paperForskning

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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between performance and CEO turnovers using a sample of 81 turnovers and 81 matching companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. We find that poor performance increases the probability of management replacements and that forced layoffs are value-increasing events while voluntary resignations are value-decreasing events. Institutional investors as active monitors, or part of corporate control, are not exhibited in the analysis of CEO turnovers. If institutional investors have any influence on CEO turnovers, then it is not revealed in our data. But, the results suggest that institutional investors' equity holdings tend to protect managers from replacement.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
UdgivelsesstedFrederiksberg
UdgiverInstitut for Finansiering, Copenhagen Business School
Antal sider33
ISBN (Trykt)8790705254
StatusUdgivet - 1999
NavnWorking Papers / Department of Finance. Copenhagen Business School
Nummer1999-10
ISSN0903-0352

Emneord

  • Direktører
  • Afskedigelse
  • Corporate governance
  • Aktiekurser

Citationsformater