@techreport{992b8750d85811db9769000ea68e967b,
title = "Centralized vs. De-centralized Multinationals and Taxes",
abstract = "The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise's choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs – here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument –, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large.",
keywords = "Multinationale selskaber, Virksomhedens strategi, Skatter, Centralized vs. de-centralized decisions, Taxes, MNEs",
author = "Nielsen, {S{\o}ren Bo} and Pascalis Raimondos-M{\o}ller and Guttorm Schjelderup",
note = "Generelle noter: Also published as CESifo Working paper nr. 1586, Munich, 2005",
year = "2005",
language = "English",
series = "Working Paper / Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School",
publisher = "Copenhagen Business School, CBS",
number = "10-2005",
address = "Denmark",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Copenhagen Business School, CBS",
}