Causality and Incentives with Multiple Tortfeasors

Henrik Lando, Urs Schweizer

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskningpeer review

Resumé

For a tortfeasor to be liable for a victim's loss, the tortfeasor's negligence must have caused the loss. In the context of multiple tortfeasors, this is generally taken to mean that but-for the tortfeasors negligence, the loss would not have occurred, given the acts by other tortfeasors. In the law and economics literature on causality, it has been claimed that this but-for test of causality does not jeopardize incentives for optimal precaution, not even when each tortfeasor's negligence is a sufficient cause of the victim's loss. We demonstrate that this claim is not generally true, and that it fails to hold in particular in the case of multiple sufficient causes. We suggest an alternative test of causality which inquires whether the victim's loss would have occurred were it not for the tortfeasor's negligence, if he other tortfeasors had taken due care. We demonstrate that this alternative test is compatible with optimal incentives subject to an unrestrictive condition.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Publikationsdato2017
Antal sider13
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2017
BegivenhedThe 29th EALE Conference 2017 - St. Gallen, Schweiz
Varighed: 21 sep. 201723 sep. 2017
Konferencens nummer: 29
http://www.eale.nl/29th-eale-conference-st-gallen/

Konference

KonferenceThe 29th EALE Conference 2017
Nummer29
LandSchweiz
BySt. Gallen
Periode21/09/201723/09/2017
Internetadresse

Emneord

  • Multiple tortfeasors
  • Causality
  • But-for test
  • Optimal incentives

Citer dette

Lando, H., & Schweizer, U. (2017). Causality and Incentives with Multiple Tortfeasors. Afhandling præsenteret på The 29th EALE Conference 2017, St. Gallen, Schweiz. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2985532
Lando, Henrik ; Schweizer, Urs. / Causality and Incentives with Multiple Tortfeasors. Afhandling præsenteret på The 29th EALE Conference 2017, St. Gallen, Schweiz.13 s.
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Lando, H & Schweizer, U 2017, 'Causality and Incentives with Multiple Tortfeasors' Paper fremlagt ved The 29th EALE Conference 2017, St. Gallen, Schweiz, 21/09/2017 - 23/09/2017, . https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2985532

Causality and Incentives with Multiple Tortfeasors. / Lando, Henrik; Schweizer, Urs.

2017. Afhandling præsenteret på The 29th EALE Conference 2017, St. Gallen, Schweiz.

Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskningpeer review

TY - CONF

T1 - Causality and Incentives with Multiple Tortfeasors

AU - Lando, Henrik

AU - Schweizer, Urs

PY - 2017

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N2 - For a tortfeasor to be liable for a victim's loss, the tortfeasor's negligence must have caused the loss. In the context of multiple tortfeasors, this is generally taken to mean that but-for the tortfeasors negligence, the loss would not have occurred, given the acts by other tortfeasors. In the law and economics literature on causality, it has been claimed that this but-for test of causality does not jeopardize incentives for optimal precaution, not even when each tortfeasor's negligence is a sufficient cause of the victim's loss. We demonstrate that this claim is not generally true, and that it fails to hold in particular in the case of multiple sufficient causes. We suggest an alternative test of causality which inquires whether the victim's loss would have occurred were it not for the tortfeasor's negligence, if he other tortfeasors had taken due care. We demonstrate that this alternative test is compatible with optimal incentives subject to an unrestrictive condition.

AB - For a tortfeasor to be liable for a victim's loss, the tortfeasor's negligence must have caused the loss. In the context of multiple tortfeasors, this is generally taken to mean that but-for the tortfeasors negligence, the loss would not have occurred, given the acts by other tortfeasors. In the law and economics literature on causality, it has been claimed that this but-for test of causality does not jeopardize incentives for optimal precaution, not even when each tortfeasor's negligence is a sufficient cause of the victim's loss. We demonstrate that this claim is not generally true, and that it fails to hold in particular in the case of multiple sufficient causes. We suggest an alternative test of causality which inquires whether the victim's loss would have occurred were it not for the tortfeasor's negligence, if he other tortfeasors had taken due care. We demonstrate that this alternative test is compatible with optimal incentives subject to an unrestrictive condition.

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Lando H, Schweizer U. Causality and Incentives with Multiple Tortfeasors. 2017. Afhandling præsenteret på The 29th EALE Conference 2017, St. Gallen, Schweiz. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2985532