Board-level Employee Representation (BLER) and Firms’ Responses to Crisis

Aleksandra Gregoric, Marc Steffen Rapp

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikel

Abstrakt

We hypothesize that companies with board‐level employee representation (BLER) experience a lower probability of crisis‐induced dismissals than other firms. Theoretically, we link this effect to the employee directors’ ability to reduce the information asymmetry and moral hazard in employee–employer contracting, thereby facilitating the implementation of labor‐cost adjustments that are an alternative to workforce dismissals. We confirm our hypotheses by analyzing the behavior of Scandinavian public corporations with/without employee directors during the Great Recession.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftIndustrial Relations
Vol/bind58
Udgave nummer3
Sider (fra-til)376-422
Antal sider47
ISSN0019-8676
DOI
StatusUdgivet - jul. 2019

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