Board Independence and Product Market Competition in Swedish Firms

Trond Randøy*, Jan Inge Jenssen

*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftReview artikelpeer review


This study suggests that firms in highly competitive industries should have fewer outside board members, whereas companies operating in less competitive industries should have more outside directors. Specifically, we argue that board independence is less relevant or even redundant in highly competitive industries, where the firm is already "monitored" by a competitive product market. Using publicly traded Swedish firms for empirical testing, this study finds that board independence reduces firm performance in industries with highly competitive product markets. On the other hand, board independence enhances firm performance among companies facing less competitive product markets.
TidsskriftCorporate governance: An International Review
Udgave nummer3
Sider (fra-til)281-289
Antal sider9
StatusUdgivet - jul. 2004
Udgivet eksterntJa


  • Board independence
  • Board monitoring
  • Product market competition
  • Performance
  • Sweden