Bid Costs and the (In)efficiency of Public Procurement Auctions

Publikation: Working paperForskning

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Abstrakt

The paper analyzes the excess entry hypothesis for sealed-bid first-price public procurement auctions. The hypothesis is proved analytically for any feasible combination of bid preparation cost and bid evaluation cost when the bidders face a rectangular cost density function and confirmed in numerical simulations based on a family of flexible cost density functions. The excess entry hypothesis implies that the procurer may reduce both his own cost and the social cost by imposing a positive fee on the bids. Sequential search is a superior strategy to a public procurement auction whether or not the procurer imposes an optimal fee on the bids.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Udgivelses stedFrederiksberg
UdgiverCopenhagen Business School [wp]
Antal sider22
StatusUdgivet - 5 feb. 2019
NavnWorking Paper / Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School
Nummer1-2019

Emneord

  • Excess entry
  • Public procurement auctions
  • Optimal fee
  • Sequential search

Citationsformater

Blomgren-Hansen, N. (2019). Bid Costs and the (In)efficiency of Public Procurement Auctions. Frederiksberg: Copenhagen Business School [wp]. Working Paper / Department of Economics. Copenhagen Business School, Nr. 1-2019