Being the Best or Being the Only One: Dichotomous R&D Strategy Choices by Startups Aiming for Acquisition

Joachim Henkel*, Thomas Rønde

*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

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Abstract

We characterize optimal R&D strategies in a model where an incumbent and a startup with no possibility to enter the market choose both investment level and radicalness of their R&D projects. The incumbent commercializes the most valuable project, and, where necessary, acquires the startup. The startup has two locally optimal strategies: A “high quality” and a “low cost” strategy where it aims for having the most valuable and the only successful R&D project, respectively. The struggle for rents inside the innovation system results in an inefficient portfolio of projects compared to the R&D choices that a monopolist would make.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Artikelnummer107024
TidsskriftJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Vol/bind234
Antal sider13
ISSN0167-2681
DOI
StatusUdgivet - jun. 2025

Bibliografisk note

Published online: 19 April 2025.

Emneord

  • R&D competition
  • Startup
  • Technology acquisition
  • Markets for technology
  • Game theory

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