Bargaining Power in Repeated Games

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Resumé

In this paper, we propose a refinement of the subgame perfect equilibrium concept for infinitely repeated games, selection-consistent perfect equilibrium. This concept reflects the idea that players may not expect future bargaining power to be correlated with bygone actions. The equilibrium payoff set is generated by equilibria with a simple recursive structure. When discounting tends to zero, the equilibrium average payoff set is almost completely determined by the data of the stage game.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftMathematical Social Sciences
Vol/bind49
Udgave nummer1
Sider (fra-til)101–110
ISSN0165-4896
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2005
Udgivet eksterntJa

Emneord

  • Repeated games
  • Renegotiation
  • Bargaining power

Citer dette

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Bargaining Power in Repeated Games. / Østerdal, Lars Peter.

I: Mathematical Social Sciences, Bind 49, Nr. 1, 2005, s. 101–110.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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