Bank Resolution in Europe: The Unfinished Agenda of Structural Reform

Jeffrey N. Gordon, Georg Ringe

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Resumé

This chapter argues that the work of the European Banking Union remains incomplete in one important respect, the structural re-organization of large European financial firms that would make “resolution” of a systemically important financial firm a credible alternative to bail-out or some other sort of taxpayer assistance. A holding company structure in which the public parent holds unsecured term debt sufficient to cover losses at an operating financial subsidiary would facilitate a “Single Point of Entry” resolution procedure that would minimize knock-on effects from the failure of a systemically important financial institution. Resolution through such a structure would minimize run risk from short term creditors and minimize destructive ring-fencing by national regulators. Although structural reform in the EU could be achieved by supervisory implementation of the “living wills” requirement for effective resolution or irresistible incentives through capital charges, it would be best obtained through addition to the EU’s Proposed Structural Measures Regulation now under consideration.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Udgivelses stedBrussels
UdgiverEuropean Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Antal sider28
StatusUdgivet - jan. 2015
NavnECGI Working Papers in Law
Nummer282/2015

Emneord

  • Bank resolution
  • Bank structural regulation
  • Single point of entry
  • Bank holding company

Citer dette

Gordon, J. N., & Ringe, G. (2015). Bank Resolution in Europe: The Unfinished Agenda of Structural Reform. Brussels: European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). ECGI Working Papers in Law, Nr. 282/2015
Gordon, Jeffrey N. ; Ringe, Georg. / Bank Resolution in Europe : The Unfinished Agenda of Structural Reform. Brussels : European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), 2015. (ECGI Working Papers in Law; Nr. 282/2015).
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Gordon, JN & Ringe, G 2015 'Bank Resolution in Europe: The Unfinished Agenda of Structural Reform' European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), Brussels.

Bank Resolution in Europe : The Unfinished Agenda of Structural Reform. / Gordon, Jeffrey N.; Ringe, Georg.

Brussels : European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), 2015.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

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Gordon JN, Ringe G. Bank Resolution in Europe: The Unfinished Agenda of Structural Reform. Brussels: European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI). 2015 jan.