Abstract
The ascriptions of ‘agency’ or ‘intentionality’ to the brain has long been regarded with suspicion from social scientists and philosophers. In the talk, I will argue that this suspicion is perfectly legitimate and that the standard response from the defenders of cognitive neuroscience is illegitimate – namely the response that such talk is technical (e.g. Ullman 1991), merely ‘metaphorical’(e.g. Blakemore 1990) or a flaw of ordinary language (e.g. Churchland&Churchland 1998).
In specific, I will discuss and present the – admittedly tentative – argument that the ascription of intentionality to the brain are conceptually incoherent because it commits a mereological fallacy (Bennett&Hacker 2001, 2007).
In specific, I will discuss and present the – admittedly tentative – argument that the ascription of intentionality to the brain are conceptually incoherent because it commits a mereological fallacy (Bennett&Hacker 2001, 2007).
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Publikationsdato | 2012 |
Status | Udgivet - 2012 |
Begivenhed | Seminar in Cognitive Semiotics - Lund, Sverige Varighed: 23 feb. 2012 → 23 feb. 2012 http://project.sol.lu.se/en/ccs/seminars/2012-02-23/ |
Seminar
Seminar | Seminar in Cognitive Semiotics |
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Land/Område | Sverige |
By | Lund |
Periode | 23/02/2012 → 23/02/2012 |
Internetadresse |