Are Ascriptions of Intentionality to the Brain Incoherent? The Mereological Argument Against Cognitive Neuroscience

    Publikation: KonferencebidragKonferenceabstrakt til konferenceForskning

    Abstract

    The ascriptions of ‘agency’ or ‘intentionality’ to the brain has long been regarded with suspicion from social scientists and philosophers. In the talk, I will argue that this suspicion is perfectly legitimate and that the standard response from the defenders of cognitive neuroscience is illegitimate – namely the response that such talk is technical (e.g. Ullman 1991), merely ‘metaphorical’(e.g. Blakemore 1990) or a flaw of ordinary language (e.g. Churchland&Churchland 1998).
    In specific, I will discuss and present the – admittedly tentative – argument that the ascription of intentionality to the brain are conceptually incoherent because it commits a mereological fallacy (Bennett&Hacker 2001, 2007).
    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    Publikationsdato2012
    StatusUdgivet - 2012
    BegivenhedSeminar in Cognitive Semiotics - Lund, Sverige
    Varighed: 23 feb. 201223 feb. 2012
    http://project.sol.lu.se/en/ccs/seminars/2012-02-23/

    Seminar

    SeminarSeminar in Cognitive Semiotics
    Land/OmrådeSverige
    ByLund
    Periode23/02/201223/02/2012
    Internetadresse

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