Altruistic Punishment in Elections

Jason A. Aimone, Luigi Butera, Thomas Stratmann

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

Altruistic punishment is a fundamental driver for cooperation in human interactions. In this paper, we expand our understanding of this form of pro-social behavior to help explain a puzzle of voting: why do individuals who are indifferent between two potential policy outcomes of an election participate when voting is costly? Using a simple voting experiment, we provide robust evidence that many voters are willing to engage in voting as a form of punishment, even when voting is costly and the voter has no monetary stake in the election outcome. In our sample, and in a robustness check through Monte Carlo simulation, we show that at least fourteen percent of individuals are willing to incur a cost to vote against candidates who broke their electoral promises, even when they have no pecuniary interest in the election outcome.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Vol/bind53
Sider (fra-til)149-160
Antal sider12
ISSN0176-2680
DOI
StatusUdgivet - jul. 2018
Udgivet eksterntJa

Emneord

  • Voting
  • Altruistic punishment
  • Laboratory experiment

Citer dette

Aimone, Jason A. ; Butera, Luigi ; Stratmann, Thomas. / Altruistic Punishment in Elections. I: European Journal of Political Economy. 2018 ; Bind 53. s. 149-160.
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Altruistic Punishment in Elections. / Aimone, Jason A.; Butera, Luigi; Stratmann, Thomas.

I: European Journal of Political Economy, Bind 53, 07.2018, s. 149-160.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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