Abstract
The paper questions the impact of rule-based governance in an environment with poor legal enforcement and general mistrust in the law-setting institutions. We conduct a quasi-experiment and a survey to prove that ‘law on books’ can still play a role by triggering the social norm of ‘obeying the law’. We furthermore expose and empirically confirm the role of the Corporate Governance Code as a signaling tool, and discuss why in a weak institutional environment the Code’s potential may be even stronger than in the developed market economies.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | European Journal of Law and Economics |
Vol/bind | 34 |
Udgave nummer | 1 |
Sider (fra-til) | 147-172 |
Antal sider | 26 |
ISSN | 0929-1261 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 2012 |
Emneord
- Corporate governance
- Hard law
- Corporate Governance Code
- Social norms
- Transition countries