Agents’ Response to Inefficient Judiciary: Social Norms and the Law in Transition

Aleksandra Gregoric, Katarina Zajc, Marko Simoneti

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    Abstrakt

    The paper questions the impact of rule-based governance in an environment with poor legal enforcement and general mistrust in the law-setting institutions. We conduct a quasi-experiment and a survey to prove that ‘law on books’ can still play a role by triggering the social norm of ‘obeying the law’. We furthermore expose and empirically confirm the role of the Corporate Governance Code as a signaling tool, and discuss why in a weak institutional environment the Code’s potential may be even stronger than in the developed market economies.
    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    TidsskriftEuropean Journal of Law and Economics
    Vol/bind34
    Udgave nummer1
    Sider (fra-til)147-172
    Antal sider26
    ISSN0929-1261
    DOI
    StatusUdgivet - 2012

    Emneord

    • Corporate governance
    • Hard law
    • Corporate Governance Code
    • Social norms
    • Transition countries

    Citationsformater