Agency Theory

Stefan Linder, Nicolai Juul Foss

    Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapportEncyclopædiartikelForskningpeer review

    Abstrakt

    Agency theory studies the problems and solutions linked to delegation of tasks from principals to agents in the context of conflicting interests between the parties. Beginning from clear assumptions about rationality, contracting, and informational conditions, the theory addresses problems of ex ante (‘hidden characteristics’) as well as ex post information asymmetry (‘hidden action’), and examines conditions under which various kinds of incentive instruments and monitoring arrangements can be deployed to minimize the welfare loss. Its clear predictions and broad applicability have allowed agency theory to enjoy considerable scientific impact on social science; however, it has also attracted considerable criticism.
    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    TitelInternational Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences
    RedaktørerJames D. Wright
    Vol/bind1
    UdgivelsesstedAmsterdam
    ForlagElsevier
    Publikationsdato2015
    Udgave2.
    Sider344-350
    ISBN (Trykt)9780080970875
    DOI
    StatusUdgivet - 2015

    Emneord

    • Adverse selection
    • Agency costs
    • Compensation
    • Conflict of interest
    • Contracting
    • Corporate governance
    • Delegation
    • Hidden action
    • Hidden characteristics
    • Incentive intensity
    • Information asymmetry
    • Informativeness
    • Monitoring
    • Moral hazard
    • Motivation
    • Nexus of contracts
    • Pay for performance
    • Principal–agent relationship
    • Second-best solution

    Citationsformater