Abstract
Many businesses adopt one-sided boilerplate contract terms and conditions that lead to protracted negotiations. Often, the parties ultimately reach a compromise that could have been reached sooner if they had put forward more balanced contract terms at the outset. We ask why this seemingly irrational behavior persists and suggest a different approach. A dominant theory suggests that putting forward balanced terms may be seen as a sign of a weak bargaining position. We argue, however, that agency conflicts and cognitive biases often better explain such behavior. Moreover, we advocate a speed-to-contract strategy where the parties elect to use more balanced (value-maximizing) terms from the outset, and thereby avoid costly negotiations as well as delays in realizing the benefits of a transaction.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Journal of Strategic Contracting and Negotiation |
Antal sider | 15 |
ISSN | 2055-5636 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 1 feb. 2022 |
Bibliografisk note
Epub ahead of print. Published online: 1. FebruaryEmneord
- Transaction costs
- Theoretical perspectives
- Boilerplate terms
- Commercial contracts
- Negotitation strategy
- Topics