A Question of Values(s): Political Connectedness and Executive Compensation in Public Sector Organizations

Renate Meyer, Markus Höllerer, Stephan Leixnering

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

While the de-politicization of public sector management was a core objective of past reform initiatives, more recent debates urge the state to act as a strong principal when it comes to public sector unity and policy coherence – and consequently make a case for reinvigorating links between the political and managerial sphere. Using data from Austrian public sector organizations, we test and confirm the causal relationship of political connectedness of board members and executive compensation. Differentiating between value-based and interest-based in-groups, we suggest that only value-based political connectedness has the potential to restore patronage as a control instrument and governance tool. Self-interested and reward-driven patronage, on the other hand, indicated by a strong association of political connectedness and executive pay, refers to the type of politicization that previous public sector reforms promised to abolish.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftInternational Public Management Journal
Vol/bind21
Udgave nummer3
Sider (fra-til)477-500
Antal sider24
ISSN1096-7494
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2018

Bibliografisk note

Published online 29-10-2015

Citer dette

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A Question of Values(s) : Political Connectedness and Executive Compensation in Public Sector Organizations. / Meyer, Renate; Höllerer, Markus; Leixnering, Stephan.

I: International Public Management Journal, Bind 21, Nr. 3, 2018, s. 477-500.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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