A Note on the Stability of Collusion in Differentiated Oligopolies

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Resumé

Stability of collusion in differentiated oligopolies is studied without symmetry restrictions on the available strategies. It is demonstrated that if the number of firms is sufficiently large, two-phase stick-and-carrot punishment schemes apply at the highest possible discount rate with respect to collusion on the joint profit-maximizing output. If stick-and-carrot punishment schemes are used, collusive stability of the joint profit-maximizing output improves monotonically with the degree of product differentiation. The conclusions contrast with those obtained by Wernerfelt [Economics Lett. 29 (1989) 303].
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftResearch in Economics
Vol/bind57
Udgave nummer1
Sider (fra-til)53–64
ISSN1090-9443
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2003
Udgivet eksterntJa

Emneord

  • Collusion
  • Product differentiation
  • Stick-and-carrot

Citer dette

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A Note on the Stability of Collusion in Differentiated Oligopolies. / Østerdal, Lars Peter.

I: Research in Economics, Bind 57, Nr. 1, 2003, s. 53–64.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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