A Note on the Stability of Collusion in Differentiated Oligopolies

Lars Peter Østerdal

doi:10.1016/S1090-9443(02)00055-8

A Note on the Stability of Collusion in Differentiated Oligopolies

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

Abstrakt

Stability of collusion in differentiated oligopolies is studied without symmetry restrictions on the available strategies. It is demonstrated that if the number of firms is sufficiently large, two-phase stick-and-carrot punishment schemes apply at the highest possible discount rate with respect to collusion on the joint profit-maximizing output. If stick-and-carrot punishment schemes are used, collusive stability of the joint profit-maximizing output improves monotonically with the degree of product differentiation. The conclusions contrast with those obtained by Wernerfelt [Economics Lett. 29 (1989) 303].

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Research in Economics
Vol/bind	57
Udgave nummer	1
Sider (fra-til)	53–64
ISSN	1090-9443
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/S1090-9443(02)00055-8
Status	Udgivet - 2003
Udgivet eksternt	Ja

Emneord

Collusion
Product differentiation
Stick-and-carrot

Adgang til dokumentet

10.1016/S1090-9443(02)00055-8Licens: Ikke-specificeret

Citationsformater

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