TY - JOUR
T1 - A New Order of Financing Investments
T2 - Evidence from Acquisitions by India's Listed Firms
AU - Jindal, Varun
AU - Seth, Rama
PY - 2019/10
Y1 - 2019/10
N2 - We propose a new order of financing investments based on the considerations of control and financial constraints in a market with the presence of business groups. We base our analysis on a sample of acquisitions, one of the largest forms of investments, made by India's publicly listed firms from 1997 through 2016. We test the relative propensity of group-affiliated firms, as well as that of standalone (non-affiliated) firms, to finance their investments with stock on the one hand, and either cash or debt on the other. We find that group-affiliated bidders have the greatest propensity to finance their investments with stock when taking over firms affiliated with the same business group (within-group acquisitions), followed by standalone firms making acquisitions (standalone acquisitions). Finally, group-affiliated bidders acquiring either standalone firms or firms not affiliated with their group (outside-group acquisitions) have the lowest propensity to finance their investments with stock. The evidence of higher stock-financing of within-group acquisitions is robust to alternative explanations of tunneling and propping up in business groups.
AB - We propose a new order of financing investments based on the considerations of control and financial constraints in a market with the presence of business groups. We base our analysis on a sample of acquisitions, one of the largest forms of investments, made by India's publicly listed firms from 1997 through 2016. We test the relative propensity of group-affiliated firms, as well as that of standalone (non-affiliated) firms, to finance their investments with stock on the one hand, and either cash or debt on the other. We find that group-affiliated bidders have the greatest propensity to finance their investments with stock when taking over firms affiliated with the same business group (within-group acquisitions), followed by standalone firms making acquisitions (standalone acquisitions). Finally, group-affiliated bidders acquiring either standalone firms or firms not affiliated with their group (outside-group acquisitions) have the lowest propensity to finance their investments with stock. The evidence of higher stock-financing of within-group acquisitions is robust to alternative explanations of tunneling and propping up in business groups.
KW - Business groups
KW - Corporate control
KW - Financial constraints
KW - Investment financing
KW - Mergers and acquisitions
KW - Business groups
KW - Corporate control
KW - Financial constraints
KW - Investment financing
KW - Mergers and acquisitions
U2 - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.04.007
DO - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.04.007
M3 - Journal article
SN - 0929-1199
VL - 58
SP - 307
EP - 328
JO - Journal of Corporate Finance
JF - Journal of Corporate Finance
ER -