A Multilevel Approach to the Process of Concession-making in Price Negotiations

Hannah Nagler; Robert Wilken; Ad de Jong; Christian Schmitz

doi:10.5771/0042-059X-2018-1-37

A Multilevel Approach to the Process of Concession-making in Price Negotiations

Hannah Nagler, Robert Wilken, Ad de Jong, Christian Schmitz

Institut for Afsætningsøkonomi

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review

Abstract

Eröffnungsangebote in Verhandlungen können als mächtiger Anker fungieren und letztlich ihr Ergebnis stark beeinflussen. Für ein tiefergehendes Verständnis des Einflusses von Startgeboten verfolgen wir einen prozessorientierten Ansatz und analysieren den Einfluss von Eröffnungsangeboten auf einzelne nachfolgende Zugeständnisse in simulierten distributiven Preisverhandlungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern. Unter Verwendung eines Multilevel-Ansatzes, der neu für diesen Forschungskontext ist, zeigen die Ergebnisse einen signifikanten Einfluss von Eröffnungsangeboten auf alle darauffolgenden Zugeständnisse von Käufer und Verkäufer sowie eine Abnahme der Zugeständnisse im Laufe der Verhandlung. Interessanterweise bleiben die eigenen Konzessionen von denjenigen des Verhandlungspartners unbeeinflusst. Die empirischen Befunde verdeutlichen also die besondere Rolle von Erstgeboten als mächtiger Anker und zentraler Einflussfaktor von Verhandlungsergebnissen. Der Planung von Eröffnungsangeboten kommt folglich eine große Bedeutung in der Verhandlungspraxis zu.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Unternehmung
Vol/bind	72
Udgave nummer	1
Sider (fra-til)	37-50
Antal sider	14
ISSN	0042-059X
DOI	https://doi.org/10.5771/0042-059X-2018-1-37
Status	Udgivet - 2018

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title = "A Multilevel Approach to the Process of Concession-making in Price Negotiations",

abstract = "First offers are powerful anchors that strongly determine the outcome of a negotiation. To gain deeper insights into the power of first offers, we adopt a process-oriented view and analyze the impact of first offers on single subsequent concessions, in simulations of distributive price negotiations between a buyer and a seller. Using a multilevel approach which is new to this field of investigation, the results show that first offers have a significant influence on all subsequent concessions made by the buyer and seller, and these concessions decrease during the course of negotiation. Interestingly, concessions remain unaffected by the opponent{\textquoteright}s preceding concession. These results thus demonstrate that the first offer is indeed a powerful anchor, as it influences all single steps required to reach an agreement.",

author = "Hannah Nagler and Robert Wilken and {de Jong}, Ad and Christian Schmitz",

year = "2018",

doi = "10.5771/0042-059X-2018-1-37",

language = "English",

volume = "72",

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journal = "Unternehmung",

issn = "0042-059X",

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T1 - A Multilevel Approach to the Process of Concession-making in Price Negotiations

AU - Nagler, Hannah

AU - Wilken, Robert

AU - de Jong, Ad

AU - Schmitz, Christian

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - First offers are powerful anchors that strongly determine the outcome of a negotiation. To gain deeper insights into the power of first offers, we adopt a process-oriented view and analyze the impact of first offers on single subsequent concessions, in simulations of distributive price negotiations between a buyer and a seller. Using a multilevel approach which is new to this field of investigation, the results show that first offers have a significant influence on all subsequent concessions made by the buyer and seller, and these concessions decrease during the course of negotiation. Interestingly, concessions remain unaffected by the opponent’s preceding concession. These results thus demonstrate that the first offer is indeed a powerful anchor, as it influences all single steps required to reach an agreement.

AB - First offers are powerful anchors that strongly determine the outcome of a negotiation. To gain deeper insights into the power of first offers, we adopt a process-oriented view and analyze the impact of first offers on single subsequent concessions, in simulations of distributive price negotiations between a buyer and a seller. Using a multilevel approach which is new to this field of investigation, the results show that first offers have a significant influence on all subsequent concessions made by the buyer and seller, and these concessions decrease during the course of negotiation. Interestingly, concessions remain unaffected by the opponent’s preceding concession. These results thus demonstrate that the first offer is indeed a powerful anchor, as it influences all single steps required to reach an agreement.

U2 - 10.5771/0042-059X-2018-1-37

DO - 10.5771/0042-059X-2018-1-37

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0042-059X

VL - 72

SP - 37

EP - 50

JO - Unternehmung

JF - Unternehmung

IS - 1

ER -