A Microeconomic Model of the Demand of Civil Justice: Is One Institutional Context Better than Another?

Maria Alessandra Antonelli, Veronica Grembi

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

The paper analyzes how institutional elements affect the decision to file of risk neutral agents. In particular, we introduce an objective probability of winning given by the combination of a precedent-weight parameter (defining the type of legal system) and a transparency factor. 603,000 simulated trials, shaped upon our model, reveal two main findings: (1) the transparency level matters in terms of inefficient decisions; (2) a precedent driven system is not necessarily more efficient. Hence, policy makers should invest in increasing the level of information among courts and between courts and the parties both in civil and common law systems.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftEuropean Journal of Law and Economics
Vol/bind36
Udgave nummer2
Sider (fra-til)295-318
ISSN0929-1261
DOI
StatusUdgivet - okt. 2013

Emneord

  • Judicial precedent
  • Transparency of the legal systems
  • Decision to file
  • Comparative efficiency of legal systems

Citer dette

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A Microeconomic Model of the Demand of Civil Justice : Is One Institutional Context Better than Another? / Antonelli, Maria Alessandra ; Grembi, Veronica .

I: European Journal of Law and Economics, Bind 36, Nr. 2, 10.2013, s. 295-318 .

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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