A Contract Design Perspective on Balancing the Goals of Utility Regulation

Anita Eskesen*

*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Abstract

Designing utility regulation involves trade-offs between different goals of contract design. Prioritising one objective may come at the cost of assigning a lower priority to another objective. This study compares four regulatory frameworks in terms of how they each prioritise different goals of contract design. While revenue-cap regulation can be said to minimise transaction costs, it also assigns a lower priority to coordination of production. Conversely, the frameworks that explicitly incorporate stakeholder engagement or negotiation prioritise coordination of production while assigning a lower priority to minimisation of transaction costs.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Artikelnummer101161
TidsskriftUtilities Policy
Vol/bind69
Antal sider13
ISSN0957-1787
DOI
StatusUdgivet - apr. 2021

Bibliografisk note

Published online: 21 January 2021.

Emneord

  • Incentive regulation
  • Customer engagement
  • Contract design

Citationsformater