Udskriv

Drawing on contractual economics and innovation management, licensing-in is hypothesized to accelerate licensees' invention process. Studying a matched dataset of licensees and non-licensees, licensees are shown to be faster at inventing, but the effect is negated if the license includes a grant-back clause, shifting incentives from licensee to licensor. Also, the effect is significantly reduced if the licensee is unfamiliar with the licensed technology. The effect of the grant-back clause is offset if the licensee is unfamiliar with the licensed technology, suggesting that the licensee retains the incentives to invent under these circumstances

Publikationsoplysninger

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftStrategic Management Journal
Vol/bind33
Tidsskriftsnummer8
Sider (fra-til)965–985
Antal sider21
ISSN0143-2095
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2012

ID: 34578746